Saudi Houthi Crisis: The roots of conflict and Riyadh’s Strategic Dilemma

The ongoing conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen has a historical backdrop. While many point out to the 2014 Houthis take-over of Sanaa, the roots go much deeper than that. To understand the conflict in detail, it is necessary to examine the historical roots of the conflict.

After the Ottoman Empire fell, the northern Yemen came under the rule of Zaidi religious and political elites and was called as Yemen Arab Republic. Zaidis are a sect within Shias. They had a good relationship with Saudi Arabia and with Saudi Arabia being in the good books of US during the Cold War, the closeness of North Yemen naturally extended to the United States.

Meanwhile, the southern Yemen, initially under the British control, came under the influence of USSR after the Suez Crisis in 1956. It was called as People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and was socialist in its outlook.

Yemen witnessed civil war between the Northern Conservatives, backed by Saudi and US, and Southern Socialists, backed by the USSR in the 1970s. However, with the disintegration of the USSR, the influence of Communism waned and paved the way for unification of Yemen in 1990, with Ali Abdullah Saleh becoming the President of Yemen.

The political unification did not translate into meaningful social and political integration at the grassroots level. There were tensions in the South against this unification, a civil war was once again fought in 1994 and the regime crushed it immensely. Saudi Arabia supported the regime and didn’t want any tensions in its border. The cultural influence of Saudi Arabia in the traditionally Zaidi stronghold areas, political marginalisation, and opposition to Saleh government grew day by day. Thus, Houthis, Ansar Allah, emerged as an internal revivalist group among the Zaidis, seeking greater identity for themselves.

During the 2011 Arab Spring, a popular uprising forced Saleh to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Even with the change in top leadership, the economic crisis deepened and it created an opening for the Houthis to expand their influence. They were also provided with necessary ammunition and military intelligence by Iran covertly. The Houthis initially allied with military units loyal to former President Saleh as they captured the Red Sea port of Hodeidah in October 2014. In January 2015, they seized the presidential palace in Sanaa, forcing President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee to the southern port city of Aden. Hadi later moved to Saudi Arabia, from where he ran his government-in-exile until his resignation in 2022.

The fall of Sanaa marked a turning point in Yemen's conflict. For Saudi Arabia, it was not merely the collapse of a neighbouring government's authority; it also raised concerns about the expansion of Iranian influence along its southern border. These fears helped shape Riyadh's decision to intervene militarily in March 2015.

Beginning in March 2015, a coalition of Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia launched a campaign of economic isolation and air strikes against the Houthi insurgents, with U.S. logistical and intelligence support. The Houthis, then with limited technological advancement and miliary capability, responded asymmetrically on Saudi Arabia by attacking its oil refineries, pipeline projects, weaponizing red sea and so on. Thus, the Houthis evolved from an insurgent movement into a force capable of controlling territory and conducting increasingly sophisticated military operations.

Meanwhile, in the Southern Yemen, calls for separatism grew aloud and a Southern Transitional Council (STC) was formed in 2017, backed by the UAE. It also started fighting against the Houthis. In 2019, a Saudi brokered deal incorporated the STC into the internationally-recognized government, operating from Riyadh.

In February 2021, Houthi rebels carried out an offensive to seize Marib, the last stronghold of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, and in early March 2021, the Houthis conducted missile strikes to Saudi Arabia, targeting oil tankers and facilities and international airports. The Saudi-led coalition reciprocated with air strikes targeting Sanaa.

Photo Credits: Al Jazeera

This conflict involving 3 players – Houthis, Saudi backed international government, the STC, took a heavy toll on the Yemeni civilians between 2014-2022. The Yemen crisis came to be called as one of the world’s worst Humanitarian crises affecting common people’s lives and livelihoods. All major parties to the conflict have faced allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.

Finally, in 2022, Hadi reluctantly transferred the powers to the new Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) headed by Rashad al-Alimi, an advisor to Hadi, with deeper ties with Saudi Arabia and UAE, took over the reins of Yemen’s internationally recognised government.

in March 2022, the Houthis hit Saudi Arabia during the Formula One Saudi Arabian Grand Prix in Jeddah. This attack demonstrated the ability of Houthis to threaten strategic infrastructure and disrupt major international events inside Saudi Arabia. After this attack, Saudi Arabia agreed for a two-month United Nations brokered truce with the Houthis. This truce, however, fell apart within 6 months.

Later, another truce, brokered by Oman, was entered into between Saudi and Houthis. Under the terms of this truce, Saudi Arabia would reportedly pay the Yemen public sector salaries, including in Houthi-held territory, and would ease restrictions on air and seaports. The deal would have also enabled the resumption of oil exports and initiated an inclusive, Yemeni-led political settlement under UN auspices.

The 2022 truce reduced the immediate intensity of the Saudi-Houthi confrontation, but it did not resolve Yemen's underlying political divisions. The Gaza war subsequently introduced a new regional dimension to the conflict, allowing the Houthis to project power beyond Yemen and challenge maritime security in the Red Sea.

When the Houthis initiated hostilities against Israel in late 2023, retaliating the Israeli attack on Hamas, it prompted the US to launch Operation Prosperity Guardian against Houthis. Notably, the Saudis were absent, unwilling to risk a resumption of transborder attacks.

In subsequent months, as the Houthis began striking Israeli ships in the Red Sea in retaliation for their violence against Palestinians, their credibility at home substantially increased, even among the majority Sunni population. The Houthis’ support for Palestine also drove more youths towards Houthis and it also raised their international profile. When many Muslim-majority governments faced criticism for the gap between their public condemnation of Israel and their limited direct action, here was a Shia insurgent group attacking Israel for their atrocities on Gaza. The Houthis used the Gaza war and their attacks on shipping and Israel to elevate their regional profile and present themselves as part of the resistance to Israeli military operations.

Following US air strikes on the Houthis, the Houthis blockaded the Bab-al-Mandeb strait severely choking the transit of goods in the Red Sea. This came days after Iran closed down the Strait of Hormuz, thereby bringing the global economy on knee.

Though Houthis is widely seen as part of axis of resistance, along with Hezbollah, they have a larger strategic interest in gaining control over the entirety of Yemen. In spite of being covertly supported by Iran, they cannot be seen as a mere pawn in this larger Geo Political context. Even if there is a détente between US and Iran in the coming days, it is unsure if the Houthis would halt their strategic advancement in capturing territories currently under the Saudi backed Yemeni leadership in exile.

The catalyst for the latest round of violence came on July 13, 2026, when an Iranian civilian plane - carrying a Houthi delegation that had attended the funeral of Iran’s assassinated Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - returned to Yemen. When the plane attempted to land at Sanaa International Airport, the runway was bombed. Yemen’s Saudi backed leadership in exile took responsibility for the attack, while the Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia for this attack. As a result of the attack, the plane was forced to land in Houthi-controlled Hodeidah.

On July 20, the Houthis announced a blockade on Saudi Arabia, targeting its oil exports through the Bab al-Mandab Strait in retaliation for its attacks and ongoing restrictions on Houthi-controlled territory. The Houthis also targeted Saudi oil refineries, civil airports and oil tankers in the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ ability to swiftly seize the Red Sea coast from forces loyal to the PLC was facilitated by the withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from Yemen in January 2026 under pressure from Saudi Arabia. Until early 2026, the UAE provided significant assistance to Southern Transitional Council (STC), fuelling Yemen’s southern secessionist movement. However, in December 2025, STC forces suddenly took large swathes of territory in eastern Yemen, which included areas along the Saudi border. Saudi Arabia responded quickly, bombing UAE ships transporting weapons to the STC and insisted that the UAE fully withdraw from Yemen.

The kingdom, which had outsourced its security to the United States, faced significant constraints in responding when the US refused to involve directly in its conflict with the Houthis. The Mecca agreement, signed with Turkey and Pakistan, also highlights certain hollowness where Pakistan and Turkey have declined to interfere directly. For Pakistan, attacking the Shia Houthis means isolating its 15-20% domestic Shia population and losing legitimacy in the Islamic world by attacking the Houthis who stood for Palestine. For Turkey, attacking Houthis means alienating Iran which provides natural gas for its energy grids and also a coordinator in suppressing Kurdish militants along its border.

Saudi Arabia now faces a difficult strategic dilemma. To attack the Houthis means prolonging an asymmetric conflict that has already imposed substantial economic and security costs. Restraint, however, could allow the Houthis to consolidate their territorial control and further threaten Saudi infrastructure and maritime trade. The kingdom which believed its cash rich economy would save it from any security contingencies has now increasingly exposed the limitations of its security strategy! Whether Riyadh can manage this challenge will depend not only on its military capabilities and external alliances, but also on its ability to pursue a political settlement that addresses Yemen's fragmented domestic power structure.